Lease--When a Building is  Destroyed --Smith v. Gillen by Palmer, Robert A.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 43 | Issue 2 Article 13
1954
Lease--When a Building is "Destroyed"--Smith v.
Gillen
Robert A. Palmer
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law
Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Palmer, Robert A. (1954) "Lease--When a Building is "Destroyed"--Smith v. Gillen," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 43 : Iss. 2 , Article 13.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol43/iss2/13
REcENT CASES
LEASE-WHEN A BuLDwr, Is "DEsTmoYSD"-SmtrrH v. GnffN-Smith
brought an action against Gillen for rent due under a lease contract
covering a storeroom. The defendant filed a counterclaim to recover
an alleged overpayment of rent, on the ground that the storeroom had
been "destroyed" within the meaning of KENucKy IEvisED STATUTE
883.110, thus releasing him from further payments of rent. The de-
fendant contended that the premises had been rendered unfit for
occupancy when they were flooded with water in an attempt to ex-
tinguish a fire which started without fault or neglect on his part. The
jury was instructed that if they believed the premises were destroyed
without fault on the tenant's part, he would not be liable for the rent
for the remainder of the term covered by the lease. The court said:
The word "destroyed" as used in these instructions does not mean
totally destroyed, but does mean where fire or other casualty injures
the leased premises to such an extent as to render the leased premises
untenable and not fit for occupancy for the purpose for which the
lease was intended to permit occupation.1
The jury found for the defendant, allowing recovery on the counter-
claim, and the plaintiff appealed: Held: Affirmed. The interpretation
of the word "destroyed" as given in the instructions, was correct. A
building is destroyed when it is rendered unfit for occupancy for the
purpose that the lease was intended to permit occupation.2
The court based its decision on KrucKx REmSF_ STATUTE 888.170,
which states:
Unless the contrary is expressly provided for in the written contract,
the agreement of a lessee that he will repair or leave the premises in
repair shall not bind him to erect similar buildings if, without his
fault or neglect, the buildings are destroyed by fire or other casualty.
A tenant, unless he otherwise contracts, shall not be liable for the
rent for the remainder of his term of any building leased by him, and
destroyed during the term by fire or other casualty without his fault
or neglect.3 (writer's italics)
The interpretation of the word "destroyed" first presented a problem
to the courts when they were called upon to interpret lease contracts
which allowed termination of the lease if the premises were destroyed
by fire or other casualty. In construing such contract provisions, a
majority of the courts have recognized that to entitle a tenant to
terminate a lease, and escape payment of future rent, there must be a
total destruction and not a partial damage to the premises. 4 At least,
'Smith v. Gillen, 245 S.W. 2d 596, 598 (Ky. 1952). The word "untenable"
should be spelled "untenantable," as was brought out later in the opinion.
Ibid. It was held to be a jury question as to the condition of the premises, in
determining if they were unfit for occupancy, or untenantable.
'Ky. 3Ev. STAT. 383.170 (1953).
'32 Amd. JuR. 412 (1941).
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the destruction must be so substantial as to require a rebuilding and
not merely a repair. In the case of Wall v. Hinds,5 the court was called
upon to interpret the word "destroyed" in deciding whether a tenant
was justified in terminating his lease. It stated the majority rule in this
manner:
The evidence fails to show such a destruction of the premises as to
absolve the defendant from the payment of rent under the covenants
of the lease. The building was, at most, only partially injured, and
could have been repaired for a sum less than a single year's rent.
The usual stipulation in leases of buildings is, that if the premises are
injured or destroyed by fire, the rent, or a proportional part thereof,
shall be abated. But in the present case it is to be observed that the
parties studiously omitted to provide for the contingency of an injury
by fire, and confined their agreement to the destruction of the prem-
ises. It would require too great a latitude of construction to hold that
the partial injury to the premises, caused by the fire, as disclosed by
the evidence, amounted to such a destruction of them as to terminate
the lease by virtue of the stipulation contained in it.6
This rule had its origin in common law, but a few courts began to
recognize that in some respects it was rather harsh to require a tenant
to pay rent under a lease when the building was untenantable or
unfit for occupancy, though not completely destroyed. Consequently,
a minority of courts began to give a more liberal interpretation to the
word "destroyed," as used in these leases. An example of this interpre-
tation is found in the language of the court in Tyson v. 11eilT where
the lease provided that the tenant might vacate the premises if they
were destroyed by fire. The court stated:
We think the intention of the parties to be gathered from the -stru-
ment was that the words 'destroyed by fire' not only contemplated a
total destruction of the building, but such damage thereto as would
render it unfit or incapable of being used for the purpose for which it
was rented.8
Statutes of the same nature as KEmm=UCK REVSED STATUTE 383.170
have been enacted in various states. These statutes were primarily
designed to protect tenants who failed to incorporate a "destruction"
provision in their agreement with the landlord. The general common-
law rule has, in some cases, been modified by the wording of the
statute so as to discharge the tenant from payment of rent, or at least
'4 Gray 256, 64 Am. Dec. 64 (Mass. 1855). The leased building in this case
was a boarding house. A fire occurred, and seven rooms were rendered un-
tenantable. The roof was damaged and the ceiling fell in several places. There
was also general dampness throughout the house, resulting from water damage.
'Id. at 268, 64 Am. Dec. at 70.
"169 Ala. 558, 53 So. 912 (1910).
8 Id. 53 So. at 914.
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to allow a reduction of the rent, when the premises are damaged so as
to become untenantable, without fault on the part of the tenant.9
Under these statutes, a new problem presented itself, as to the
meaning of the word "untenantable." In certain instances, premises
might be in a condition to be occupied, or they might be tenantable.
However, they also might be damaged to such an extent that they
were incapable of being used for the purpose for which they were
rented. This problem arose in the case of Millen Hotel v. Gray,'° and
there the court stated that a leased building becomes "untenantable"
so as to authorize the tenant to quit paying rent when it is damaged
by fire to such an extent that it is unfit for carrying on the tenant's
business, the purpose for which it was rented." In the statutes of some
states, including Kentucky, there is no use of the word "untenantable."
Instead, the word "destroyed" must be interpreted.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has previously been called upon
to interpret the meaning of KENrucxy lEvisED STATUTE 883.170. In
Scott Bros. v. Flood's Trustee,'2 a tenant occupied four buildings under
a single lease, and one of them was destroyed by fire. The court
allowed an abatement of rental payments based on the proportion
which the part destroyed bore to the whole rent, saying that the pur-
pose of the statute was to protect the tenant, and to relieve him from
the payment of rent on a building or buildings when their value to
him bad been destroyed without his fault or neglect. In Abrams v.
Simon,'3 the Kentucky court said that under the statute, the lessees of
premises were obliged to prove that the building was damaged to such
an extent as to destroy its utility for purposes of occupancy, and if
that were proved, the building would be held to have been destroyed.' 4
By following the statutory interpretation adopted in these two
previous cases, the court in the instant case allowed a total cessation
9 The Maryland Code provides that ". . . whenever the improvement on
property rented for a term of not more than seven years shall become unten-
antable by reason of fire or other unavoidable accident, the tenancy shall thereby
be terminated, and all liability thereunder shall cease .. . [writer's italics] ANNo.
CODE, Pun. GEN. LAWS MD., ART. 53, SEc. 37 (1939).
"067 Ga. App. 38, 19 S.E. 2d 428 (1942).
'lId. 19 S.E. 2d at 429. The court used the above standard in determining if
the lease could be terminated. However, it was decided under the facts of the
case that the damage was insufficient to render the premises unfit for the purpose
for which they were rented. See Weinstein v. Schachter Bros., 32 Ga. App. 742,
124 S.E. 803 (1924), where the court held that a building was untenantable when
it was damaged so that the tenant could not carry on his mercantile business.
22124 Ky. 739, 99 S.W. 967 (1907).
S243 Ky. 773, 49 S.W. 2d 1031 (1932).
" Ibid. In this case, however, the lessees failed to meet the burden of proof,
since the damage was not sufficiently extensive to meet the standard imposed by
the court.
KENTuciKy LAw JouRNAL
of rent payments when the utility of the premises was totally destroyed
for the lessee's business purpose.
It is submitted that the court adopted the correct interpretation
of the statute. It is remedial in nature, and should be interpreted in
a manner which will correct a condition that is unfavorable to the
tenant. It is believed that the common-law requirement of total
destruction of premises, before a tenant could be relieved, is too harsh.
The Kentucky statute should be construed reasonably, in the light of
modem business practices. It is so unusual for any building to be
completely destroyed, that such a result should probably be excluded
from consideration. It is reasonable to assume, in light of the intention
of the General Assembly, that the word "destroyed" should be given
a liberal meaning, favorable to the tenant. The word should describe
an event which renders the premises useless for the purpose for which
they were leased, for then their value and utility are truly "destroyed"
as far as the tenant is concerned.
RoBERT A. PALmiz
ToRTs-LcRNsaEs AND Tkm DUTY OwED Timm.-Plaintiff, a minister,
went to defendant's garage to solicit money from the proprietor. Plain-
tiff was told that the latter was on the second floor of the garage. An
unidentified employee of defendant's led plaintiff to a freight elevator,
the only method of reaching the second floor. With plaintiff aboard,
the elevator ascended half-way, then suddenly dropped a foot or so,
causing plaintiff to lose his balance and fall to the first floor. It
developed that the elevator had fallen several times in the past, but
that it had been recently repaired and was thought to be in perfect
condition. Held: Judgment dismissing plaintiff's action affirmed.
Ockerman v. Faulkners Garage.1
The court in this case was faced with two problems. First, it had
to determine the status of the plaitiff, i.e., whether he was a trespasser,
licensee or business invitee. Second, it was required to define the exact
duty owed to a person of that particular status.
In determining the status of the plaintiff the court examined the
purpose for which he was on the land. Ascertaining that he had come
to solicit money for his own purposes-that there was no mutuality of
business interest between the plaintiff and the defendant-the court
applied the principles laid down in the Restatement of Torts, sees. 3302
1 Ockerman v. Faulkner's Garage, 261 S.W. 2d 296 (Ky. 1953).
BESTATENMNT, TORTS sec. 330 (1934): "A licensee is a person who is privi-
leged to enter or remain upon land by virtue of the possessor s consent, whether
given by invitation or permission.
